Neptune Orient Lines Limited (NOL) was started as Singapore’s national shipping line to facilitate industrial development and support the economy. The CMA CGM Group (CMA CGM) had acquired 67 per cent of NOL from Temasek Holdings Private Limited for SG$2.3 billion or $1.30 per share—a 6 per cent premium over the last closing price. In 2016, CMA CGM sought to acquire the remaining shares at the same price so that it could delist NOL and take it private. In order to delist, the company would need to acquire another 23 per cent of shares to hit the acceptance threshold of 90 per cent. Should the remaining shareholders sell their shares at $1.30 per share, or hold out for a better price? Should bondholders of CMA CGA and NOL be concerned about the acquisition?

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Food Empire Holdings Limited (Food Empire) was a food and beverage brand owner and manufacturer of instant beverage products, frozen convenience food, confectionery, and snacks. Its main markets were Russia and Ukraine. When the political tensions between Russia and Ukraine erupted and their currencies depreciated in 2014, Food Empire’s bottom line was badly affected: its share price dropped 71 per cent in 30 months. In light of these developments, investors were not sure if they should sell their investments in Food Empire. Using financial statement analysis and various valuation concepts—including net tangible assets, dividend discount models, and peer multiples—it was hoped that the best course of action could be determined.

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In 2014, Alibaba—the Chinese e-commerce giant who, in September 2014, completed the largest initial public offering (IPO) in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) history—was preparing itself for an additional round of capital fundraising. This time, Alibaba focused its efforts on a new, large bond issue. Its chief executive officer would lead Alibaba’s finance team in meetings with investors in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London to gather information about this pending bond issue. Although Alibaba was listed on the NYSE, an overwhelming majority of its revenues originated in China. Most U.S. investors had not heard of Alibaba until just a few months prior to its IPO in September 2014. Also, being a high-tech company, Alibaba was subject to the potential for large swings in valuations typical for the industry. Fluid valuations and matters related to country risk premia meant pricing the bond issue was going to be a challenge. How would Alibaba estimate the bonds’ pricing? Further, how should the firm determine the location and timing of the new bond issue?

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In June 2016, Illinois Tool Works (ITW), a fortune 500 manufacturing company in the United States, was at a critical juncture in its evolution. The company had identified a number of lofty goals in its 2015 annual report to be achieved by the end of 2017. These expectations included reaching over 200 basis points in organic growth above the market, a 23 per cent operating margin, a 20 per cent after-tax return on invested capital, 100 per cent free cash flow as a percentage of net income, and 12 to 14 per cent shareholder returns. Riding on the success of 2015, these targets had seemed achievable based on ITW’s performance and operational excellence. However, the U.S. and world economies faced a variety of challenges related to political uncertainty in the United States due to a presidential election and also in Europe because of the United Kingdom’s recent decision to exit the European Union. Additional challenges such as continued weaknesses in emerging markets and volatile currencies also affected ITW’s outlook. ITW’s acquisition strategy had yielded excellent results over the past few years by effectively using diversification and decentralization strategies in its growth, but there was considerable uncertainty about achieving future goals. ITW had to make important choices about resource allocation across product groups based on their past performance and future prospects. The CEO also had to make appropriate decisions for continued superior performance.

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Established in 2013, Glints was an online job search service for new graduates, marketing itself as “LinkedIn for youth.” The Singapore-based company was founded by three 21-year-olds who chose to put their university education on hold and forfeit their scholarships in order to pursue their entrepreneurial ambitions. Using the lean start-up approach, Glints pivoted its business model several times before finding a suitable position in a resegmented job-search market. As a young company, Glints’ biggest challenge was growth. Having raised seed capital of SG$475,000 from its investors, Glints was expected to sustain its exponential growth in revenue base and the number of subscribers. Its young co-founders had to identify ways to make that growth happen.

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In 2016, a personal threat was made against the managing director of Multistrada Agro International, an Indonesian industrial forestry firm. The permits for the firm’s new rubber plantation overlapped with an existing palm oil plantation and the activities of local villagers, and also drew concern from outsiders who claimed to have rights over the land or wished to protect the environment. In sum, the venture altered the delicate balance of conflicting local interests. The managing director knew that unless she managed to work with local stakeholders, she would never be able to successfully operate large-scale rubber plantations. How should she handle this latest threat? What tactics could she use to deal with a variety of stakeholders with divergent interests?

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Adeline Ong is the new Independent Director of Lim Palm Co., a family business listed at the Singapore Exchange. During her second meeting the board approves an important strategic decision on an acquisition. Adeline realizes that input from independent directors does not seem welcome and that the board does not adequately fulfil its role. Rather, the company’s governance systems are shaped by family dynamics and hierarchies. Unable to contribute constructively in the existing situation, Adeline wonders whether she can add value to the Lim Group as an independent director, and if so, how.

In 2012, the incoming general manager for AdNike Pharmaceutical’s operations in China faced a major challenge. AdNike was a leading global pharmaceutical company that had been in China for over 40 years. However, its performance in the country had been worse than expected. In the most recent half-decade of its operations in China, AdNike faced a changing regulatory environment that was becoming more challenging to navigate. Also, local competitors were making significant inroads into AdNike’s business. The new leader was charged with reinvigorating the company so it could achieve the growth and performance that was originally intended. Despite being new to China and not speaking any Mandarin, he had to determine a new strategic direction for AdNike while balancing the needs of external and internal stakeholders.

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In January of 2016, Singapore International Airlines Group (SIA) announced that it had secured more than 90 per cent stake in Tiger Airways Holdings Limited (Tigerair), and would take Tigerair private. Once the buyout offer closed on February 19, trading in Tigerair’s shares would be suspended because the free float had fallen below the minimum 10 per cent threshold. Tigerair had been suffering losses amounting to more than SG$600 million from 2012 to 2015. When SIA initiated the buyout offer, Tigerair’s shareholders wanted to use the discounted cash flow model, the discounted dividend model, and relative valuation to determine whether the buyout was a fair deal.

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In 2010, two entrepreneurs launched Joyful Frog Digital Incubator (JFDI), Southeast Asia’s first start-up accelerator in Singapore. They aimed to help develop Singapore’s start-up environment through a structured program that provided access to early stage funding and mentorship. More than 70 start-ups had graduated from the program, and more than half had raised substantial funding. However, five years later, in 2015, JFDI faced challenges as a result of Singapore’s small market size, the more than 20 accelerators that had entered the market, and an uncertain macroeconomic climate. The founders wondered whether JFDI should open up new revenue streams by diversifying into advisory and consultancy services, such as in-house accelerator programs in established corporations. Alternatively, should the company expand geographically to broaden its access to capital, talent, and new markets? Or were there still other options that the founders should pursue?

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