This case illustrates the rise and fall of the former chief executive officer (CEO) of the National Kidney Foundation (NKF) Singapore, T.T. Durai. In June 2007, Durai was charged with corruption and sentenced to three months in jail. Just less than two years prior, he had been the prolific CEO who had transformed the NKF from a small foundation into Singapore’s largest charity, with 21 dialysis centres. Durai spent 37 years of his life volunteering and working with the NKF, and initiated research, marketing and fund-raising strategies for the charity. Under Durai’s helm, the charity’s revenue grew from $17 million to $116 million. Dialysis centres in other parts of the world sought Durai’s expertise to improve their dialysis programs. This case documents the unfolding events that led to surprising revelations in court. These include Durai’s leadership style, controversial decisions, bountiful entitlements and debatable actions taken to achieve his aims. In all, the case provides a perceptive insight into how differing perceptions of responsible leadership affected the stakeholders of the NKF, and encourages readers to analyze and propose how things could be improved, or could have turned out differently.

The Ciputra Group was set up by Mr. Ciputra in the 1980s, after a long entrepreneurial career with a vision to provide a business for his children. The case describes the development of this group, which evolved into a prominent and innovative player in the Indonesian property sector. Under Mr. Ciputra’s guidance, the company became known for its satellite cities, in which the group combined technical, construction, and urban planning qualities, along with the ability to understand and manoeuvre in the difficult Indonesian environment. This model was later exported to other emerging markets. The case ends with the company facing two sets of interlinked problems. One set is strategic, as the company’s business model has proven to be vulnerable, and it is undergoing various changes. The question is what strategic option the company should choose. The second set of issues concerns the leadership and corporate structure of the group. Since Mr. Ciputra is in his late 70s, a generational change in leadership is imminent, and students are asked to reflect on the most appropriate path towards further development of the business from one led by a charismatic entrepreneur towards a professional family business. The two sets of issues are interlinked with each other and pose opportunities and constraints.

The case narrates the story of the Rodamas Group, owned by the ethnic Chinese Tan family in Indonesia. The company started as a trading firm in 1951 and over time became a joint venture partner in manufacturing businesses with a range of mainly Japanese partners after Indonesia started to embark on an industrialization program in the late 1960s. In the 1980s, the company was slowly transferred to the second generation leader, and continued to grow and prosper until it became part of the top-20 business groups in Indonesia. The businesses included glass manufacturing (with Asahi), personal care products (with Kao), packaging (with Dai Nippon) and MSG production. The role of Rodamas in these partnerships was to deal with local regulations, hiring local personnel, and distributing the products in Indonesia. When the then President Suharto was toppled in the Asian Crisis in 1998, Indonesia underwent several drastic changes, including the transition to democracy. Its economy became more open, and foreign firms were allowed to operate in the country without having a local partner. In addition, several global business developments, including the tendency of multinationals to rely on lawyers and consultants, rather than local equity partners, threatened the Rodamas business model. In view of this, the current leader, Mr. Mucki Tan, is reconsidering the future of his company and weighing a few options. Students are asked to analyse the company and its environment, decide on a strategic direction and reflect on the consequences.

In September 2014, Mr Woon Chio Chong, Executive Vice President, Bus Development of SBS Transit, was wondering what changes to the organisation, strategies and operations of SBS Transit should be made to improve its profitability and pole position in the public bus transportation business in Singapore. This was following the announcement by the Singapore Government in May 2014 that public bus transportation was shifting from a privatised to a government contracting model. The bus service industry was defined by its yearly profits, service standards and safety records. Previously, the concern of profitability by bus operators resulted in neglect of routes and offerings deemed as unprofitable. The privatised model was dominated by two basic bus operators, SBS Transit and SMRT Buses. SBS Transit had a market share of 75% before the change in model and operated 5 different bus services. Formed in 1973, it evolved from a bus company to a multi-modular transport operator, retaining bus operations as a subsidiary. Both companies kept each other in check by acting as the benchmark for the other’s performance, in the areas of service quality, reliability and punctuality. However, profits had been steadily declining with rising costs of fuel prices and labour expenses.

The government contracting model would see ownership of buses and bus infrastructure being transferred to the government, while operators vie for the rights to ply various bus routes through competitive bidding. This would lower the barrier of entry to the market and attract more bus operators into the market, increasing competition for SBS. While the initial phase of the new model would guarantee the incumbent operators an 80% of bus services, more bus services will be tendered out over time. More stringent bus arrival timings have come in place in recent years, under the Bus Service Reliability Framework, placing pressure on bus services to ensure high service standards. In the face of future competition and increased demands from the government, Mr Woon would thus have to position SBS to best tackle the challenges ahead.

In August 2013, Mr Chanratha, Director of General Education & Community Development, Pour un Sourire d’Enfant (PSE), was wondering what specific social enterprise programs could be developed and implemented to help the sole bread winners and/or wives of families relocating to SMILE Village in Cambodia to first replace income derived from scavenging, and through skills training, to gradually become self-supporting. Cambodia was one of the world’s poorer nations, the country having been racked by civil war in the latter part of the 20th century. Approximately 4 million people lived on less than US$1.25 per day and 37% of Cambodian children under the age of 5 suffered from chronic malnutrition. More than 50% of the population were less than 25 years old.

PSE was founded by Christian Des Pallières and his wife, Marie-France in 1995. PSE was committed to improving the livelihood of children in Cambodia, specifically those living in the slumps. They provide basic education, vocational training and support services to children from the most impoverished families. The SMILE village project was aimed at finding sustainable solutions in addressing the inhumane living conditions of families of PSE students in order that these children might be educated, and every family might break the bonds of poverty. The key challenge was to help the poor families relocating to the SMILE village, build the capacity to establish a stable source of income, manage their families and grow as a community. The help of 12 student consulting teams were sought to develop feasible social enterprise ideas for the first smile village and to provide implementation plans for these social enterprise ideas.